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Although Heidegger’s explicit account of “poetic dwelling” belongs to his later philosophy, there are 
important indications that he was already engaging with the core matter of the notion in his early 
thought. Contrary to the idea that in Being and Time, “dwelling” amounts to mere practical coping 
with the environment, we would like to demonstrate that the notion is already a poetic issue in his early 
thought, as it requires the appropriation of our relation to the world via an authentic experience of fin-
itude. Following a topological mode of thinking, the paper thematizes the connections between Heide-
gger’s early and later thought, and elucidates the following three points: First, “freeing” and “letting” 
appears as the appropriate ethos of a poetic experience of finitude, one that maintains the “clearing” of 
meaningfulness. Second, a topological reading of Being and Time can explicate the notions of authen-
ticity and inauthenticity as different disclosures of the clearing where human being-world correlation 
occurs. Third, the notion of “keeping-still” (Schweigen) can be interpreted as an authentic disposition 
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that frees space for the disclosure of existence. The paper concludes that an authentic experience of 
finitude through “stillness” appears to reorient human ethos by releasing “discourse” from absorption 
in “idle-talk” and that such an act of existential re-orientation of one’s disposition towards the world is 
the essence of “authenticity,” and Heidegger’s early “poetic dwelling”.
Keywords: Heidegger, Being and Time, poetic dwelling, finitude, Gelassenheit, silence, authenticity, 
topology.
ПУТЬ ХАЙДЕГГЕРА К ПОЭТИЧЕСКОМУ ОБИТАНИЮ  
ЧЕРЕЗ БЫТИЕ И ВРЕМЯ
ОНУР КАРАМЕРДЖАН




Хотя эксплицитное рассмотрение «поэтического обитания» относится к поздней философии 
Хайдеггера, есть важные признаки того, что он обращался к смысловому ядру этого понятия 
в своей ранней мысли. Вопреки представлению, что в Бытии и времени «обитание» сводится 
лишь к  практическому взаимодействию с  окружающим миром, мы хотели бы показать, что 
это понятие имеет поэтический смысл уже в его ранней мысли, поскольку оно требует обре-
тения собственного отношения к миру посредством аутентичного опыта конечности. Следуя 
топологическому способу мышления, статья тематизирует связи между ранней и поздней мыс-
лью Хайдеггера и обосновывает три тезиса. Во-первых, «высвобождение» и «позволение» рас-
крываются как собственный этос поэтического опыта конечности, который хранит «просвет» 
значимости. Во-вторых, топологическое прочтение Бытия и времени позволяет эксплициро-
вать понятия собственности и несобственности как различные модусы раскрытия просвета, 
в котором осуществляется корреляция человеческого бытия и мира. В-третьих, понятие мол-
чания (Schweigen) может быть интерпретировано как собственная установка, открывающая 
пространство для раскрытия экзистенции. В  статье делается вывод о  том, что собственный 
опыт «молчания» переориентирует человеческий этос посредством освобождения речи от по-
глощенности «толками» и что подобный акт экзистенциальной переориентации установки по 
отношению к миру есть сущность «собственности» и «поэтического обитания» у раннего Хай-
деггера. 
Ключевые слова: Хайдеггер, Бытие и  время, поэтическое обитание, конечность, Gelassenheit, 
молчание, собственность, топология.
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Das Bleibende im Denken ist der Weg. Und Denkwege ber-
gen in sich das Geheimnisvolle, daß wir sie vorwärts und 
rückwärts gehen können, daß sogar der Weg zurück uns 
erst vorwärts führt.
M. Heidegger (Heidegger, 1985, 94)
1. INTRODUCTION
Although there is a growing body of literature that explores the idea of “poetic 
dwelling” and its implications for Heidegger’s later philosophy (Seamon & Mugerauer, 
1985; Singh, 1997; Davis, 2006; Capobianco, 2014; Malpas, 2020), early hints of this 
notion have received little scholarly attention1. Since Heidegger’s deliberate reflec-
tions on the meaning of “poetic dwelling” belong to the later period of his philosophy, 
it is deemed that Heidegger’s early thoughts should not have much to do with themes 
related to “poetic dwelling”2. Nonetheless, a topological approach that focuses on the 
continuities in Heidegger’s philosophy3 can explicate that Heidegger was already en-
gaged with the core matter of “poetic dwelling” in Sein und Zeit4, even if he did not 
employ the same terminology, style of writing and method. To show this, we will turn 
to SZ after having first identified the significance of the idea of “poetic dwelling” in 
Heidegger’s later philosophy. How the core issues of the “poetical” and “dwelling” are 
already linked in SZ will come to the fore against this background5.
1 Werner Marx’s work was one of the earliest studies that focused on the concept of ‘poetic dwelling’ 
(Marx, 1972, 235–261). See also Absher (2016) for a contemporary discussion that deals with the 
question of language. 
2 The prevailing tendency in Heidegger studies is to treat his early and later philosophy as two de-
tached periods of thought, taking “the turn” (Kehre, or Wendung, Wandlung) that occurred in the 
1930s as the breaking point, which is a view that we are challenging in this article. For a detailed 
review of the discussion, see Sheehan (2015, 246).
3 “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this 
is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to 
what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if 
it is contained in [Heidegger] II” (Heidegger, 2006, 151).
4 References to Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, abbreviated as SZ) are from the 11th edition. For the 
translation of German terms, I am following the John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson transla-
tion with minor changes. For the translation of quotes and key concepts from the rest of Heidegger’s 
Gesamtausgabe, I am consulting the standard English translations, with some modifications.
5 In order to offer a comprehensive reading of Heidegger’s philosophy, our primary aim is to make 
sense of Heidegger’s relevant ideas in their own right rather than try to criticize them, as the latter 
should be the task of another study.
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2. THE PLACE OF ‘POETIC DWELLING’ IN HEIDEGGER’S THOUGHT
Let’s first try to understand why “poetic dwelling” matters as a philosophical 
topic, since its significance in Heidegger’s philosophy has been a matter of dispute. 
While some commentators (Lyotard, 1991; Leach, 1999) associate the notion with a 
patriotic sense of belonging to one’s home, “poetic dwelling” should be considered 
as a fruit of Heidegger’s long-standing engagement with the very “question of be-
ing” (Seinsfrage), which is always linked with the idea of “finitude.” It is well known 
that Heidegger’s explicit investigations of the meaning of the “poetical” are insepara-
ble from his engagement with Hölderlin’s poetry6. Heidegger draws the very idea of 
“poetic dwelling,” or dwelling poetically, from Friedrich Hölderlin’s poem entitled In 
lieblicher Bläue7, which is a poem that Heidegger continued to interpret as late as in 
19708. Although the aptness of Heidegger’s Hölderlin interpretations can be a matter 
of debate, it is evident that what he finds particularly valuable in Hölderlin’s poetry 
amounts to more than mere ‘poesy’ as a cultural achievement or the tranquilization 
of one’s soul9. It is rather a mode of “thinking” that “poetizes,” a poetry that is adept at 
thinking the boundaries and existential situation of the human being on the earth as 
a finite, “placed” being. 
One of the obstacles that prevents many commentators from making sense of 
Heidegger’s “poetic dwelling” within the larger context of Heidegger’s writings stems 
from the tendency to disregard or underestimate how Heidegger’s “topology of being,” 
which we will explain below, is directly linked with his way of dealing with the ques-
tion of being. For instance, the parallel that Heidegger draws in Letter on Humanism–
which is at the junction of Heidegger’s earlier and later writings– between the notion 
6 Heidegger’s interpretations of Hölderlin’s hymns in the 1930s and early 40s on the rivers of the Rhe-
in (GA, 39) and the Ister (GA, 53) are particularly indicative of a move towards his mature account 
of ‘dwelling place’.
7 Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde (Hölderlin, 1951, 372).
 If we read the entire poem, we can see that Hölderlin’s poetizing of dwelling leads to an inquiry of 
the place of the human being, the latter being inextricable from God, which the human being con-
siders as the “measure” (Maaß) of his being on the earth.
8 Here we are specifically referring to the Das Wohnen des Menschen essay, which is not translated 
into English although it requires a close attention on its own (Heidegger, 1983a, 217–218).
9 Gosetti-Ferencei suggests that Heidegger overlooks the place of Hölderlin’s thought vis-à-vis Kant 
and German idealism, and if we scrutinize Hölderlin’s understanding of poetic subject, we would 
see that his project shows a commitment to Enlightenment ideals. In arguing so, Gasetti-Ferencei 
takes distance from the idea of “resoluteness” in SZ, favoring later Heidegger’s idea of Gelassenheit 
as a poetic way of “letting-be” (Gasetti-Ferencei, 2004, 2–5, 8). Nonetheless, we will show that the 
two are in fact connected in an interesting way. 
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of “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-sein) in SZ and his later reflections on “poetic 
dwelling” (Heidegger, 1976, 358) is an important indication regarding the necessity to 
situate the issue within the context of the place-character (Örtlichkeit) of Heidegger’s 
thought of being10. In that context, one way of approaching the issue would be by way 
of introducing Heidegger’s notion of the “fourfold” (Geviert), which, starting from the 
mid-1930s and 40s, replaces the early concept of “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-
sein) in Heidegger’s philosophy. Yet, since we will already talk about the core matter of 
the “fourfold” in terms of the “making-space” and “belonging-together” of dwelling, 
we will not engage with that concept per se11. First, let’s clarify what dwelling (wohnen, 
Aufenthalten) means.
The poetic nature of dwelling appears to be one of the most important themes 
in Heidegger’s late philosophy as his topological thinking becomes explicit in his writ-
ings in the 1950’s and onwards. However, that does not mean that his topological 
philosophy spontaneously occurred around that time. His thinking of space and place 
matured over time, and it encompassed different topics in his consequent reflections. 
Heidegger’s own formulation of “topology of being” (topologie des Seins) describes the 
historical-thematical development of his thought, according to which the “meaning–
truth–place” trifold (Heidegger, 2005, 344) is key in grasping it in its entirety. The-
matically and historically, the middle term and step in Heidegger’s thought, namely 
un-concealment or the “truth” of being (αλήθεια) ties the former and latter of these 
together: The un-concealment that is at issue does not only refer to the disclosure of 
(the meaning of) particular entities, but more primordially to the dis-closure of the 
openness of meaningfulness (Sinnlichkeit), which is related to how this is made pos-
sible emerging in and of the place (τόπος) of experience. In that regard, how one is to 
sustain the open region of un-concealment turns out to be inextricably related to the 
problem of “dwelling,” which Heidegger problematized with the notion of ethos. 
10 For another crucial parallel between Heidegger’s early and later idea of “dwelling” in connection 
with the etymological meaning of the word “being” as “building” (bauen) (Heidegger,1967, 54; 
2000, 149).
11 In a nutshell, Sky (Himmel) and earth (Erde) respectively delineate the openness and boundedness 
of dwelling, while immortals-divinities (Göttlichen) and mortals (Sterblichen), as the inhabitants of 
those two domains, imply the relationality between different experiences of (im)mortality. Fourfold 
is the play-field (Spielraum) of the unity of these four elements, and if there is to be dwelling at all, 
these four need to be gathered in their mutual conditioning and belonging. Dwelling takes place in 
this “dimension”. With the “fourfold,” Heidegger’s aim is to emphasize the holistic sense of dwelling 
by pointing out that an appropriate experience of situatedness in the world requires an experience 
of limit, being conditioned by that which one cannot regulate, manipulate.
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Following Heidegger’s own indications, many commentators such as Malpas 
(2006, 277–278), Nancy (2007, 42) and more recently Artemenko (2016, 65) draw our 
attention to the nuance between ἔθος and ἦθος, which implies a thinking that tries to 
make sense of “ethics” not in the sense of a person’s morality, but as ethos in the sense 
of “dwelling”. Indeed, one of the clearest and most important indications regarding 
the significance of “poetic dwelling” can be found in Letter on Humanism (Heidegger, 
1976, 358). Here, Heidegger overtly speaks of his overall philosophical project as an 
attempt to think the foundations of both “ontology” and “ethics” (as well as “logic” as 
that which pertains to λόγος. Approaching the issue within that framework brings 
into focus that with the idea of poetic dwelling, Heidegger attempts to resituate our 
thinking towards the issue of “being” (Sein) by finding a non-dualistic access to the 
Ur-problems of “ontology” (nature of being) and “ethics” (nature of human conduct).
For Heidegger, in order to achieve this goal, the objective must be to think 
what he called the “truth of being,” which neither ethics nor ontology are capable 
of achieving (Heidegger, 1976, 357). To that end, according to Heidegger, we need 
to consider “being” (Sein) from the “clearing of being” (Lichtung des Seins), or the 
“Da” (there, openness), which the human being (as ek-sistence) sustains (Heideg-
ger, 1976, 325). Dwelling is the human being’s proper ‘relation’ to the clearing, or 
as Heidegger specifies in the footnote, “ekstatic in-standing (Innestehen) within the 
clearing” (1976, 325). This means that Heidegger looks into problematizing ethos 
of “ek-sistence” through an analysis of the “belonging together” of the clearing and 
the human being. If we regard the clearing as the openness in and through which 
things become meaningful, then κόσμος (not cosmos as the world within which there 
are things encountered, but the world as the occurrence of ‘un-concealment’ itself) 
and the human being’s ἦθος are not to be thought as two phenomena detached from 
one another that need to be bridged by an external relation. On the contrary, their 
“relation” is a “belonging together” in the openness of experience via meaningful 
presence (Anwesung). The aim is to find the appropriate mode of “belonging” to one’s 
existential, open-bounded situatedness by orienting oneself in κόσμος as a mortal, 
which is the core matter of “poetic dwelling” as the enactment of this pre-onto-ethi-
cal “belonging together” of being. 
At this point, we should ask what renders “dwelling” poetical? For Heideg-
ger, the poetic element at issue is clearly not a mere quality of literary production, 
but rather points at a certain way of inhabiting the earth. Ποίησις stems from the 
infinitive form of the verb ποιεῖν, meaning to “make” (Heidegger, 2000, 192). Τhe 
“making” that is at stake here concerns the relation (Bezug) that one must hold to a 
thing in order to be able to let it come to the fore (hervorbringen) from its hiddenness. 
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This is in line with Heidegger’s characterization of the notion of “poetry” (Dichtung, 
from dichten via Latin dictare) as telling something that has not been told, indicating 
an original beginning (Heidegger, 1993, 7–8). In this line of thinking, the adjective 
“poetic” signifies a way of realizing our relatedness to the world by an original “mak-
ing,” a kind of creation that prioritizes the disclosure of that which is concealed. 
However, the specific kind of “making” at issue with both poetic and dichterisch does 
not connote a concept of disclosure that occurs by “pro-ducing,” “leading-forth” and 
“commanding,” but first and foremost by letting a phenomenon (or an aspect of a 
thing) come into the open on its own accord. In ‘making’, the human being appears 
to clear the “way,” letting the unconcealment of meaning of things in different ways. 
Therefore, what makes us the distinct kind of beings that we are (the “clearing” of 
“being”) is not our capacity to effect, give form and product, but simply to be the 
“freeing” of the way of coming-to-be of things12. Dwelling, which requires building, 
first needs “making-space” (einräumen) in the existential dimension to which the 
human being belongs. In other words, the act of building, before it comes to mean 
erecting buildings, needs the openness and freed space. In that sense, in and through 
dwelling, the human being attempts to find the proper ‘”measure” (μέτρoν) in the 
world where such building-dwelling can happen. Yet measuring the world (Heide-
gger, 2000, 199–200) is not counting or quantifying some distance in a geometrical 
way13, but has the sense of allowing our belonging to “being” to determine our place 
in the world. 
By this way of seeing the matter, “poetic dwelling” appears as a probe into the 
essence of the notion of “freedom,” yet again, one that precedes an ontological and 
ethical determinations, primarily bringing to the fore its “taking place” as such. Ac-
cording to Heidegger, “to dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within 
the free, the preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence. The 
fundamental character of dwelling is this freeing” (Heidegger, 2000, 151). This passage 
12 An interesting parallel can be traced via the etymology of the verb meaning to ‘create’. The original 
meaning of Latin crescere is to “cause,” or “let grow,” also related to the name of the Roman goddess 
Ceres, namely, ancient Greek Demeter. As such, the sense of letting that is at issue is primarily re-
lated to letting something emerge and grow from place, from the earth (Klein, 1971, 175).
13 Mitchell’s analyses of Heidegger’s “fourfold” also approaches the issue in terms of the question of 
“relationality,” which he puts as the “hospitality of things.” Accordingly, things can exist as things 
insofar as there is the between as that which makes them present for one another. The middle space 
“hosts” and provides space for distinct ends of a dimension in the same body and place (Mitchell, 
2015, 5, 282). However, Mitchell’s remark that the “between” refers to some “geometrical-abstract” 
sense in which it surrounds things seems to be off the mark given Heidegger’s explicit reminder 
against such an interpretation.
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overtly ties together the topological aspect of making-space with the question of free-
dom. The etymological connection that Heidegger draws between “peace” (Frieden), 
“freedom” (Freiheit), “free” (Freie-Frye) and “freeing” (freien) links up with the way in 
which Heidegger understands the creative “making” at issue in the sense of “engaged 
releasement” or “letting-be”14. “Poetic dwelling” amounts to undergoing an experi-
ence with the “taking place” of that which human beings cannot control and master, 
but that which they have to bear and endure by first making space for its unfolding. 
According to Heidegger, as long as one “dwells” (ek-sists), one dwells poetically, or 
else, dwelling does not happen at all. In that case, the human beings continue to be 
present in the world, yet with no space or freedom to be what they potentially can 
be. As a result, dwelling un-poetically, there remain only detached human “subjects” 
standing against an objectified “world” that consists of stuff to be infinitely restored, 
controlled and manipulated in line with subjectivist, and often conflicting needs and 
ambitions: we are out of measure.
3. APPROACHING BEING AND TIME TOPOLOGICALLY
Late Heidegger’s emphasis is that the core matter of “poetic dwelling” is mak-
ing-space for the unconcealment of being, which is not a subjectivist achievement of 
the individual, but an occurrence that comes about by the human being’s partaking in 
its manifestation. Now, even though in SZ Heidegger does not have any explicit and 
sustained discussions of the “poetical,” there is a short and important passage which 
is often omitted in recent scholarship: ‘‘In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of 
the existential possibilities of one’s disposition (Befindlichkeit) can become an aim in 
itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence’’ (Heidegger, 1967, 162)15. What 
that means is, we must focus on the human being’s different modes (authenticity and 
inauthenticity) of disclosedness in and through which the very limits of this dwelling 
14 Bret Davis considers possible translations of the notion of Gelassenheit, submitting that “release-
ment” does not do justice to the nuances of the German, while “letting-be” preserves the “lassen” in 
Gelassenheit. Yet, this runs the risk of giving a sense of mere “allowance” or “letting go.” Therefore, 
Davis clarifies that Heidegger’s emphasis is on the sense of ‘getting into, engaging with, getting in-
volved with things’ [Sicheinlassen auf] as “actively letting beings be themselves.” Thus, Gelassenheit 
is ‘engaged releasement’ (Davis, 2007, xxv-xxvii). 
15 As early as 1925, Heidegger argues that poetry is a “setting-free” of the human being’s new possi-
bilities of being (Heidegger, 1988, 375–376). These lecture courses that Heidegger gave during the 
summer semester at the Marburg University are considered to contain the first drafts of Sein und 
Zeit. 
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come into view. We find this idea in SZ in regards with the setting free of the human 
beings from their inauthentic idleness16.
In SZ, the question of “being” (Sein) is taken up in regards with the ontolog-
ical-existential analysis of Dasein, who is capable of problematizing its own being, 
which is a specific kind of entity that has an understanding of being on the basis of its 
world (Heidegger, 1967, 200). Recall that the notion of Dasein is a correlation of das 
Da (the there as the openness of the world) and Sein. Simply meaning “existence” in 
ordinary German lexicon, for Heidegger the concept denotes specifically the essence 
of the human existence as “being-in-the-world”17. Krell provides a comprehensive 
etymological explanation of the word “existence,” which can further clarify the wide 
range of connotations that Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein implicates: 
Whence the terms Ekstase, ekstatikon, derived from the verb existanai, existemi “to 
displace,” in Heidegger’s analysis of temporality? His own etymology, the reference to 
Existenz and ex(s)istere, “to stand out,” is hardly the place to terminate the discussion. 
True, the words “existence” and “ecstacy” share the same root: sto, “stare” derives from 
the Greek sta- histemi (“to set,” “to place”), the Sanskrit sthâ, sthalam meaning “locus” or 
“place.” The Latin ex(s)isto or ex(s)to has an extensive history: in Livy, Cicero, and Augus-
tine it means “to step out” “to come forth,” “emerge,” “appear”: in Lucretius, Caesar, and 
Cicero “to spring,” “proceed,” “arise,” “become”. (Krell, 1986, 54)
The core matter at issue with Dasein analysis is neither an investigation of the 
nature of Dasein as the subject of metaphysics as mind, consciousness, spirit etc. 
(Heidegger, 1967, 46), nor the relationship between human subjectivity and the world 
as two detached entities. The central problem is to find out how the worldhood of the 
world always opens up through the specific way of being of Dasein18, which is Dasein’s 
disclosedness. This means that it is a questioning that first necessitates laying out the 
16 Heidegger argues that this is not to be seen as a moral deficiency of the human being. The “fallen-
ness” of Dasein is simply an ontological tendency. The human being’s fallen mode of being in the 
world indicates the ordinary self, one that is content with an average interpretation of the world: 
namely, “the they,” or “one” (Das Man). Thus, freeing oneself from this mode of being rather means 
“appropriating” it by releasing oneself from being enchained to such a mode of being. 
17 For an overview of the worldhood of the world in SZ, see Heidegger (1967, 65). 
18 In the 1940s and 50s, Heidegger expressed discontent with certain aspects of his early thought as 
well as with its reception (Heidegger, 1985, 89; 1998, 357). Yet, far from disparaging or even casting 
off the basic insights of SZ (Heidegger, 1976, 343, 372), Heidegger pointed out that the major diffi-
culty lied in the lack of a non-metaphysical language to speak about these issues, which points to a 
larger problem in Western metaphysics as such.
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place-nature of the “belonging” between the human being and being19. Thus, SZ is an 
inquiry into the finite nature and conditions of ‘dwelling’ and the sense of situatedness 
without which ‘being’ cannot even occur as a meaningful question. Yet, precisely, the 
key question is, what can qualify this particular situatedness as a poetic “belonging”. 
Now, concerning the “authenticity” of dwelling, some commentators, such as 
Hubert Dreyfus (1995), focus on the first division of SZ, and thematize the “existential 
spatiality” of Dasein20. For instance, Dreyfus explicitly claims, “What is near is that 
with which I am currently absorbedly coping” (1995, 134). Criticizing the primacy of 
the epistemological modes of thinking that dominated Western philosophy since Pla-
to and Descartes, Dreyfus argues that mindedness is the enemy of expert coping. As 
such, Dreyfus’s Heidegger interpretations refute the representational mode of think-
ing that separates the inner from the outer, where the inner states of mind produce 
knowledge about the external reality via mental representations. According to Drey-
fus, then, dwelling means skillfully mastering one’s practical relation to the nearest 
world, that is, environment (Umwelt), therefore the human being can already dwell 
authentically in the everydayness. Nevertheless, although Dreyfus’s vision of embod-
ied mode of philosophizing, based on a hermeneutical reading of ordinary existence, 
is extremely important in its own regard, it does not do justice to the entire project 
of SZ. Considering the overall structure of SZ and Heidegger’s own indications later 
on (1983b, 263), it should not be omitted that the first division of that book makes 
sense simply as a preliminary analysis, with the aim of explaining the human being’s 
most immediate, absorbed mode of being in the world. Owing to the phenomeno-
logical method of SZ, the way in which “ek-sistence” occurs in the world can only be 
approached by first taking into account the way in which it appears on the basis of 
human beings’ ordinary and practical dealings and engagements. Consequently, the 
first division of SZ gets us as far as the inauthentic “belonging” to the world: “Idle 
talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, 
Dasein is its ‘there’–the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1967, 175). 
This mode of failing to belonging to the world, being captivated in it, reveals a kind 
of fleeing from dwelling. The characteristic of the fleeing-absorbed human being is 
explicitly called “never dwelling anywhere” (Aufenthaltslosigkeit) (Heidegger, 1967, 
19 In the later thought, the same issue of “belonging together” was taken up through the question of 
language as the “relation of all relations” (Heidegger, 1985, 203).
20 For instance, Malpas discusses in detail why Heidegger’s early notions of space (Raum), place (Stelle, 
Platz) and “existential spatiality” do not amount to a topological mode of thinking as such (Malpas, 
2006, 45–65). He argues that in SZ we see early beginnings of a topological thinking that brings into 
view a sense of “situatedness”.
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173), signifying the lack of dwelling. Through such a way of being, the human being 
loses the sight of her or his “end” in the world, missing of the wholeness of existence. 
What one needs to see is rather the existential reorientation of our disposition in the 
world, a kind of ethos whose relation to the world is one of “nearness” and belonging, 
but not absorption or spatial involvement for the latter two do not disclose the exis-
tence in its wholeness, but only one aspect of it.
Starting from the first chapter of the second division (§46–53), Heidegger com-
mences developing his investigation of the human being’s possibility for authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit), meaning owning one’s existential possibilities instead of fleeing from 
them. Although the human being is “thrown” into an infinite number of possibilities 
in the world, death (Tode), as the temporal “end” of being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 
1967, 234), demarcates the definite limit of the human being’s all other possibilities. 
In dying, which is always taking place through every moment, being-in-the-world 
comes into its proper wholeness, or completion. This is precisely where the individ-
ual human being finds (or loses) one’s poetic freedom towards existence. The human 
being is situated between birth and death, where everydayness occupies this middle 
place. Whether the individual human being (existenziell) can inhabit human beings’ 
(existenzial) unique ethos in the world, being thrown into it and being-open-towards-
death, determines whether one can dwell, and not just be absorbed in one’s environ-
ment. In other words, the discussion of “authenticity” can be considered to be Heide-
gger’s early notion to designate the poetic element of existence.
4. FREEDOM FROM INAUTHENTICITY: ‘KEEPING-STILL’
Let us recontextualize the issue: “Poetic dwelling” is a matter of our “relation” 
to being, i.e., how one is to sustain one’s belonging to the world in an appropriate way. 
The core issue of “poetic dwelling” denotes discovering the appropriate comportment 
toward the world that makes-space for the disclosure of existence, instead of only 
mastering it from a closed-off region. In SZ, this idea is explicated in terms of the 
freedom towards death that the authentic self manages to appropriate, make her or 
his own. Inauthenticity simply refers to: “submitting and surrendering to the everyday 
manner of relating oneself to the world” (Heidegger, 1967, 139). This does not mean 
that the everydayness is inauthentic as such, but remaining stuck in such a “relation” 
to the world is. Thus, to show the implicit account of “poetic dwelling” in SZ, we 
interpret “keeping-still” as a way of releasing oneself from inauthentic absorption in 
“idle-talk.” 
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For both early and late Heidegger, silence as “stillness” (Stille) possesses an ev-
ident existential priority over “discourse” in terms of its capacities of disclosing the 
boundaries of existence21. In his early thought, Heidegger calls the inauthentic use 
of discourse (Rede) “dle-talk” (Gerede), which does not disclose, but repeats and gos-
sips around, denoting the absence of a clear sight as to discern whether what one 
talks about actually says (shows) something or not. The discussion of the “idle-talk” 
is closely tied to the problem of inauthentic–un-poetic mode of dwelling, as Heideg-
ger substantiates his arguments regarding the link between one’s situatedness in the 
world and discourse through a topological mode of thinking. The notion of “idle-
talk” appears as the “groundlessness” (Bodenlosigkeit) of discourse (Heidegger, 1967, 
176–177)22, designating the “uprootedness” and “lostness” (Verlorenheit) of the self 
in receiving and articulating the world. The lost self reveals the dis-oriented mode of 
being-in-the-world. Getting immersed in “idle-talk,” one is carried away by the su-
perficial (durchschnittlich) understanding of the world. More specifically, Heidegger 
argues that “Idle–talk, which closes things off […] belongs to Dasein’s understanding 
when that understanding has been uprooted” (Heidegger, 1967, 170). Seen from a 
topological point, the uprooting of the human being refers to the dis-placement from 
one’s proper existential situation as a mortal, no longer remaining open towards one’s 
finitude. What that also means is that the inauthentic human being, having been used 
to being stuck in midst of things, loses the sense of freedom towards the boundaries 
of her or his proper “ek-sistence.” 
The inauthentic self not only loses her or his free relation to the world, but is also 
either in ignorance or denial of this state of being. Yet, the lost space for “freedom” can 
be recovered with an experience of one’s own “being-towards-death” (Sein-zum-Tode). 
Heidegger conceptualizes the possibility of regaining one’s freedom via the notion of 
“anticipatory determinedness” (vorlaufende Entschlossneheit) (Heidegger, 1967, 329). 
With the notion of Ent-schlossenheit, what Heidegger has in mind is another word that 
says αλήθεια in the sense of “resolving” one’s self to one’s “limit” (terminus), thus arriv-
21 Later Heidegger makes this relationship clearer: “But speaking is at the same time also listening. 
It is the custom to put speaking and listening in opposition: one man speaks, the other listens. But 
listening accompanies and surround, not only speaking such as takes place in conversation. The 
simultaneousness of speaking and listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening. 
Speaking is listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but before we 
are speaking” (Heidegger, 1985, 243).
22 Grondin puts the matters concisely: « L’homme est, littéralement, déraciné dès lorsqu’il a perdu le 
sens de la terre. Terre et sol, avant d’être des échos de l’idéologie Blut and Boden, sont pour Heide-
gger, comme pour d’autres et à d’autres titres, des symboles de la finitude du Dasein » (Grondin, 
1988, 391).
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ing at a sense of “releasedness”23. As regards the idea of resoluteness, we consider the 
attempt to regain one’s open-boundedness as an act of “reorientation”. The “releasing” 
of “releasedness” is in fact the same “letting” of Gelassenheit. As such, neither early nor 
late Heidegger was interested in mere “tranquility” of being-free from an experience 
of Angst. The freedom at issue always implies a sense of freedom from a certain mode 
of absorbedness–for early Heidegger from inauthenticity and for late Heidegger from 
“das Gestell” of modern technology, which brings the human being to the liberated, 
cleared region of letting. The de-termined human being, which means the self that is 
resolved to keep her or his proper “end” in sight, needs to recover her or his authentic 
relationship to the world by way of finding a space of existential freedom, which is 
what Heidegger calls in SZ the “freedom towards death” (Heidegger, 1967, 266). 
It is in this context that the discussion of “keeping-still” (Schweigen) provides 
a key access to the fledgling account of “poetic dwelling.” Accordingly, (1) Stillness is 
the key constituent of discourse, (2) Stillness is not mere muteness, or lack of utter-
ance (Heidegger, 1988, 368–369). In SZ, Heidegger argues: “Keeping-still has been 
characterized as an essential possibility of discourse. Anyone who keeps still when he 
wants to give us to understand something, must ‘have something to say’” (1967, 296). 
Here, it clearly appears that “having something to say” differs from uttering words, 
being talkative or expressing oneself. Here, translating “Schweigen” as “keeping-still” 
instead of “reticence” shifts our attention from mere muteness toward to the act of 
listening (zuhören). The act of “keeping-stil,” which brings out our being given over to 
‘stillness’ Verschwiegenheit, appears as a way of disclosing existence in its entirety –in 
terms of its finitude. 
To clarify what is at stake with the notion of “stillness” here, we must recall that 
one discloses of existence neither by refusing to talk nor by talking a lot. In “keep-
ing-silent,” one primarily enables hearing, which remains unintelligible to the inau-
thentic human being who is absorbed and lost in abundance of things to express (or 
without anything to say). The inauthentic human being speaks either too much, not 
really saying anything, or has nothing to say, because she or he has not understood 
anything. The ability to step back from “idle-talk” means enacting an existential re-
orientation of one’s interpretation and understanding of the world by “keeping-still.” 
This is the sense in which “keeping-still” refers to the making-space for a poetic mode 
of disclosure, differing from “speaking-at-length” (viel–sprechen) (Heidegger, 1967, 
164). Yet, “idle-talk” and poetic discourse should not be seen as the two extremes 
23 In Heidegger scholarship, Sheehan astutely acknowledges (2015, 262) this point by explicitly argu-
ing that the later Gelassenheit is the parallel of early “authenticity.”
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of the same pole. In relation to that, Heidegger takes precaution by arguing that, “In 
no case is Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been 
interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself ’, so that it just beholds 
what it encounters” (1967, 169). What that also implicates is that poetic discourse 
does not refer to a higher speech by which the human being can have direct access to 
the essence of things. We have no way of simply discovering or expressing the “truth 
of being,” or of things out there as real facts by merely “keeping-still.” One does not 
spontaneously arrive at “poetic discourse” and stay there in a realm of absolute au-
thenticity, for one always has to wrestle the possibility of such a discourse by being-in-
the-world, constantly falling back to “idle-talk.” The freedom from “idle-talk” is not a 
permanent state of being. One has to awaken again and again through a specific mode 
of attentiveness. “Keeping-still” makes space for such an attentiveness that will bring 
the human being face to face with one’s open-boundedness.
In SZ, the poetic nature of “stillness” comes to the fore again via the discussion of 
the “call of conscience” (Ruf des Gewissens) (Heidegger, 1967, § 55–58). For Heidegger 
“conscience” (Gewissen) does not refer to some theological, biological or similar ontic 
dimension of factuality. He writes, “Conscience gives us something to understand, it 
discloses” (Heidegger, 1967, 269). That which it discloses only occurs in the form of a 
“call” (Stimme), a call that “attunes” the human being to own one’s basic determination 
as disclosedness. Here, it is important to see that the “voice of conscience” occurs as 
a “call” (Ruf), and it is within this context that we can consider its primary existential 
relation to the space-making of listening. In “hearkening” (hörtchen) to the call, “the 
Self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgment and hiding-place, gets brought to 
itself by the call” (Heidegger, 1967, 273). This means that hearkening to the “call of 
conscience” opens up a way to “return” to one’s own: one’s finite being. This aspect can 
be observed in regards to Heidegger’s discussion of the “voice of conscience” (Stimme 
des Gewissens), especially in relation with the human being’s “being-towards-death,” 
as that to which the authentic self is attuned and disposed. In hearkening to the “call of 
conscience,” one takes a step back from the kind of hearing that produces “idle-talk.” 
The self that hearkens to the “call of conscience” can no longer remain satisfied with 
the tranquilizing coveredness of one’s mortal being as is the case through an everyday 
manner of understanding and interpreting the world. One frees oneself from being-
free-of Angst, which covers over the temporal disclosedness of Dasein. In other words, 
“hearkening” makes-space for an authentic understanding and interpretation of the 
world in and through which one can dwell poetically. 
What is particularly interesting vis-à-vis the “call of conscience” is precisely 
the non-linguistic nature of the call, since the conscience discloses its matter without 
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speech. In that regard, even if the discussion of the “call of conscience” is not specifi-
cally on language, it brings out Heidegger’s early idea of “no-thingness” in SZ, which 
offers an interesting avenue of thinking the matter of language beyond the metaphys-
ics of presence, and redeem it as the openness, (or as the later “abyss” [Abgrund]) of the 
possibility of any “meaningful presencing”24. As Schalow argues, hearkening opens up 
a dialogue that emerges from our openness to listening, emplacing the human being 
in a position to be able to “have something to say”25. When we read the “call of con-
science” under this light, it appears that our authentic relation towards our discur-
siveness does not come about by our capacity of manipulating the signs of language, 
but by our capacity to heed the openness that is directed towards meaningfulness, 
which is also Heidegger’s later account of language. We certainly need “discourse” 
to be able to speak and communicate, but the disclosive nature of “discourse” first 
needs the “stillness” of listening. Heidegger’s later idea of “poetic dwelling” requires 
an experience of our open-boundedness through language which is the “way-making 
movement” of the “clearing.” In turn, in the early account, the call of conscience shows 
forth “nothingness” (Nichts),–or emptiness–as the way in and through which “being” 
(Sein), as a non-entity, occurs. The “call of conscience” reveals this very “no-thing-
ness” of being, through its non-linguistic emergence. It conveys “no-thing” just as it 
comes from “no-where.” It gives no information regarding one’s existential situation, 
and it provides no moral guidelines as to how to act in a certain circumstance. As 
the “call” transmits “no-thing,” the “call of conscience” brings the human existence 
to encounter the incompleteness of its temporal being as a whole. Indeed, the ‘call of 
conscience’ brings the human existence into its unique, finite “situation” of emptiness, 
to its proper “disposition” of belonging to the world, where one finds oneself exposed 
to one’s futural “no-longer-being-there” (Nicht-mehr-Dasein). What this means is that 
the call appeals the human being to appropriate her or his place, which is not a loca-
tion in space, but simply the world-situation into which the human being is always 
already thrown. This place, which is a “no-place,” a ground which is a “no-ground,” 
24 18th century German philosopher Hamann, who also considered language as logos in opposition 
to reason, talks about the abysmal essence of logos (Hamann, 1825, 151). Heidegger acknowledged 
Hamann’s designation of language as an ‘abyss’ (Abgrund) in his later thought, in the 1950 essay 
Language (Heidegger, 2001, 189).
25 “While Heidegger maintains that the call of conscience provides the first clue to Dasein’s partic-
ipation in the disclosive power of language, scholars often overlook the dialogic power of this si-
lent voice. For in saying ‘nothing,’ the call of conscience illustrates that hearing precedes saying, 
and hence it is only by first ‘listening’ that human beings acquire the power to speak” (Schalow, 
2002, 38).
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bounded by emptiness, is the definitive-resolved “situation” of human existence26. As 
such, instead of considering the “call of conscience” as the site or location of “poetic 
dwelling”27, we should rather conceive it as the “limit” at which the inauthentic hu-
man being regathers the possibility of becoming authentic.
5. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have shown that dwelling is neither mere spatial containment, 
nor aesthetic-psychological attachment to a certain landscape. (a) If the meaning of 
dwelling poetically on the earth is to sustain the human ethos that safeguards the 
“clearing of being,” and if this requires (b) a poetic experience of the open-bounded-
ness (opened towards the world–determined by finitude) of existence by keeping-still, 
we can conclude that Heidegger’s “poetic dwelling” was already taking shape in that 
early work. 
As such, Heidegger’s fledgling account of “poetic dwelling” implies that the 
whole point of being is not to try to occupy the emptiness that surrounds us, but let 
it flourish, be the proper boundary of our existence. What we are experiencing in our 
technologically-determined world is a sense of limitlessness, an incapacity to appro-
priately situate ourselves where we stand existentially, which shows itself noticeably in 
pressing economic, environmental, and ethical challenges. Looking at the issue from 
a pre-onto-ethical and post-philosophical standpoint, Heidegger offers no help as to 
how to tackle such problems. This, however, cannot be considered a mere default 
of his thinking. On the contrary, Heidegger appears to be following such a route on 
purpose, explicitly arguing that we should stop expecting too much out of philosophy 
(Heidegger, 1976, 364). What we cannot determine is whether Heidegger’s idea of 
poetic dwelling is convincing or not. Yet any critical assessment that disagrees with 
Heidegger’s way of seeing the matter, then, must not disregard that one is not only 
standing against one period or aspect of his thinking, but rather his entire philosoph-
ical project.
26 Kotoh puts the matter in a concise way: “It is not logos, but the silence as the ‘basic mood/voice’ 
(Grundstimme) that encounters the wonder of the presencing of being.” His concluding remarks are 
very worthwhile considering: ‘‘One should listen […] belongingly to the sound of silence, which 
constantly emanates from the depths of the indescribable, and continue to let this be the source of 
one’s own language’’ (Kotoh, 1987, 211).
27 Here I am referring to Brogan’s idea that the “conscience” appears as the “site” of the transition from 
the inauthenticity to authenticity (Brogan, 2013, 34–36).
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